We identify general domain properties that induce the non-existence of efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules in the 2-agent exchange economy. Applying these properties, we establish impossibility results in several restricted domains; for example, the intertemporal exchange problem (without saving technology) with preferences represented by the discounted sum of a temporal utility function, the "risk sharing problem" with risk averse expected utility preferences, the CES-preference domain, etc. None of the earlier studies applies to these examples.
Introduction
In the "exchange economy", an allocation rule, or simply, a rule, associates with each profile of agents' preferences a single desirable allocation, a list of individual consumption bundles. We refer to the set of admissible preference profiles as the domain. We are interested in the following two basic requirements of rules. The first is efficiency, the requirement that no one can be made better off without anyone else being made worse off. The second is strategy-proofness (Gibbard, 1973 , Satterthwaite, 1975 , the requirement that truthful representation of one's preference always weakly dominates any admissible misrepresentation.
A number of earlier studies have shown impossibilities of satisfying the two requirements together with other standard equity criteria. In particular, in the 2-agent case, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) , Zhou (1991a) , and Schummer (1997) show that there is no efficient and strategy-proof rules satisfying the minimal equity criterion, "non-dictatorship"; a rule is dictatorial if there is an agent, the dictator, who always receives his best bundle.
1 However, their results are not fully satisfactory because they provide no implication for various interesting allocation problems in which agents' preferences are restricted for some intuitive or technical reasons.
For example, in the "intertemporal exchange problem" (without saving technology), we often consider preferences that are represented in the additively separable form by temporal utility functions and discount factors. In the "risk sharing problem", we often consider preferences that are represented in the expected utility form by strictly convex ("risk aversion") utility indices and subjective probability distributions over states. Also, in many applications, we focus on preferences that satisfy technical conditions such as "smoothness", "continuous differentiability of utility functions", "quasilinearity", etc.
Our main objective is to strengthen the impossibility result for the 2-agent exchange economy by identifying general domain properties that are sufficient for the impossibility. These properties are satisfied by the domains considered in the earlier studies by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) , Zhou (1991a) , and Schummer (1997) ; our result simplifies their proofs. More importantly, our domain properties are applicable to several restricted domains such as the intertemporal exchange problem, the risk sharing problem, the domain of "CES preferences", and the domain of quasilinear, strictly convex, and smooth preferences, etc., while none of the earlier studies applies to them.
The seminal study by Hurwicz (1972) shows that in the 2-agent and 2-good exchange economy, there exists no efficient and strategy-proof rule satisfying individual rationality, the requirement that everyone should be at least as well off as in his endowment. Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) strengthen his result by replacing individual rationality with non-dictatorship. However, their conclusion crucially relies on the admissibility of "discontinuous" preferences, while Hurwicz's result pertains to preferences satisfying the classical assumptions, "continuity", "monotonicity", and "convexity". Zhou (1991) reinforces the impossibility result by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) , considering the classical domain consisting of continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex preferences. When preferences are strictly monotonic, this conclusion extends to any larger domain, as he remarks. A natural question addressed by Schummer (1997) is whether the impossibility applies to smaller, yet interesting, domains. He shows that the impossibility continues to hold both in the domain of "homothetic" preferences and in the domain of "linear" preferences (preferences with linear utility functions).
The arguments used by Zhou (1991) and Schummer (1997) crucially rely on the admissibility of "kinked" preferences. 2 So their results do not apply, for example, to domains consisting of only smooth and strictly convex preferences. On the other hand, Schummer (1997) crucially relies on the homotheticity restriction. So, his result does not apply to other restricted domains, for example, the domain consisting of only quasilinear and strictly convex preferences. Our domain properties do not necessarily require that kinked or homothetic preferences be admissible. They are applicable not only to all the above domains but various other restricted domains as we show in the application of our main result.
Several recent authors bring out some important domain properties in different perspectives of their studies on strategy-proofness. In a voting model, Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou (1991) identify the unique maximal domain in which a class of rules, called "voting by committees", are strategy-proof. The maximal domain issue is studied also by Berga and Serizawa (2000) in the 1-dimensional public choice model. In a linear production model, Maniquet and Sprumont (1999) identify domain properties under which their characterization results apply.
Most of the earlier studies focus on "product domains", Cartesian products of families of individual preferences.
3 Product domains do not capture the interdependency, or correlation, of preferences across agents, which is common in reality. Such an interdependency arises especially when agents share identical cultural or historic background relevant to their preferences. Thus, it is standard in implementation theory to capture such an interdependency by considering nonproduct domains: see Moore (1993) for a broad survey of literature. Therefore, we do not restrict our attention only to product domains; our domain properties are stated for possibly, non-product domains. Strategy-proofness is a necessary condition for the implementability in dominant strategy equilibrium both in the product domain case and in the non-product domain case. It is also sufficient in the product domain case, while it is not in the non-product domain case.
This paper is composed of five sections. In Section 2, we introduce the model and basic concepts. In Section 3, we define general domain properties and establish our main result. In Section 4, we provide some applications. We conclude in Section 5.
The model and basic concepts
We consider l-good exchange economies, l ≥ 2, with social endowment Ω ∈ R l ++ and two agents. Let N ≡ {1, 2} be the set of agents. Let Z ≡ {z ∈ R l·2 + : N z i = Ω} be the set of feasible allocations. Let Z 0 ≡ {z i ∈ R l + : 0 z i Ω} be the set of possible consumption bundles for each agent. 4 We use z, z , z , etc. to denote allocations: z i denotes i's bundle at z. Notation −i refers to the agent other than i. Each agent has a preference, a complete and transitive binary relation over R l + . Preferences are continuous, strictly monotonic over R l ++ , and convex . 5 Let R be the class of all such preferences. A preference
Since we keep the social endowment fixed, an economy can be characterized by a preference profile in D. A social choice rule, or simply a rule, over D is a function ϕ : D → Z associating with each economy a feasible allocation.
A domain D is a product domain if for each i ∈ N, there exists
We do not restrict ourselves to product domains. However, the following feature of product domain is important in our result. 4 We denote elements of Z 0 by z i , z 0 , x, y etc. Vector inequalities, , ≤, <, are defined as
We write x ≤ y if x y and x = y. We write x < y if for all k ∈ {1, · · · , l}, x k < y k . 5 We use R i to denote agent i's preference and P i and I i to denote its strict and indifference relations respectively. A preference R i is strictly monotonic over 
6 Profile R is reachable from R through iterative unilateral variations if there exists a finite sequence of profiles ( 
We next define our two main requirements of rules. Given R ∈ D, an allocation z ∈ Z is efficient for R if there exists no z ∈ Z such that for all i ∈ N, z i R i z i and for some j ∈ N , z j P j z j . Let P (R) be the set, called Pareto set, of all efficient allocations for R.
In order to define the next requirement, consider agent i ∈ N with preference
. Agent i will have an incentive to represent his true preference as opposed to the misrepresentation with R i if z i R i z i . We refer to this condition as i's incentive compatibility condition associated with R i , R i , z i , where R i is i's true preference, R i is a misrepresentation, and z i is the "truthful outcome". We require that incentive compatibility condition should never be violated. Formally, a rule ϕ : D → Z satisfies strategy-proofness if for all i ∈ N and all R, R ∈ D with
We show that every efficient and strategy-proof rule has the following dis- 
We use the following notation. For all R i ∈ R and all
upper contour set of R i at z i " and the "strict upper contour set", respectively.
the "lower contour set of R i at z i " and the "strictly lower contour set".
The main result
We consider domain D ⊆ R N that has a subdomainD ⊆ D and a reference set M ⊆ Z satisfying the following three properties.
The first property is that the reference set M is the Pareto set for at least one economy inD with strictly monotonic preferences.
A1, Potential efficiency:
There exists R ∈D such that P (R) = M and both R 1 and R 2 are strictly monotonic.
The second property is that each agent can always make M be the Pareto set by announcing a preference admissible inD.
A2, Attainability:
The third property is stated in terms of the following notions. Two incentive compatibility conditions associated with
. Therefore, given R −i and the truthful outcome z i for R i , the set of incentive compatible outcomes for R i coincides with Figure 1) . A preference R i of agent i exhibits crossly local dominance of z i relative to R −i , R −i , z i if agent i with R i prefers z i to every allocation that is efficient for (R i , R −i ) and is in −i's incentive compatibility set associated Figure 1 ). Our next property states that for any two profiles R and R with the Pareto set M and for any two efficient allocations z and z , there exist an agent i ∈ N and his preferenceR i that is a local transformation of R i at z i relative to R −i and exhibits crossly local dominance of z i relative to R −i , R −i , and z i (see Figure 1 ).
A3, Transformability with crossly local dominance:
For all R, R ∈D and all z, z ∈ M, if P (R) = P (R ) = M and z = z , then there exist i ∈ N and There are domains that satisfy the above three properties and over which we do have efficient, strategy-proof, and non-dictatorial rules.
Example 1 Risk sharing with an objective probability distribution and aggregate certainty:
Let l be the number of states. Each state k = 1, · · · , l is realized with probability π k . Each bundle x ∈ R l + is a state-contingent commodity. Let R * be the family of all preferences R 0 ∈ R that has the following "expected utility" representation: there exists a concave function u 0 :
Letm be the constant aggregate wealth across states.
Note that the equal division ((
We now show that R N * and M satisfy the above three properties. A1 and A2 are trivial. Let R, R ∈ R N * be such that P (R) = P (R ) = M. Let z, z ∈ M and z = z . Then since M i is a monotonic path for each i ∈ N, without loss of generality we may assume
We now introduce additional domain properties that will induce the nonexistence of rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-dictatorship. The following notation is useful. Let R 0 ∈ R and all
. Note that since UC (·) and H (·) are defined as subsets of Z 0 , although p supports R 0 at z 0 , there can be a bundle x outside Z 0 , which is preferred to z 0 , or
} be the set of all vectors supporting both R 1 at z 1 and R 2 at z 2 . Note that when z is efficient for R, ∇R (z) = ∅.
A domain is flexible if there exist a subdomainD and a reference set M satisfying A1, A2, A3, and the following two properties, F1 and F2. Condition F1 states that for any preference and any bundle, there is an admissible local transformation with sufficiently flat indifference curve at the bundle (see Figure 2 (a) ). This property obviously implies the admissibility of local transformation.
Next condition F2 states that given an agent i and an allocation d ∈ M , there exists a profile R ∈D whose Pareto set intersects with M only at (0, Ω) and (Ω, 0) , and such that whenever an efficient allocation z = d for R happens to have d on the hyperplane supporting R at z (see Figure 2 (b) ), changing i's preference is admissible so that for the new profile (R i , R −i ) , such a coincidence never happens at any efficient allocation in i's incentive compatibility set associated with
We next provide an example of flexible domain and an example of "inflexibility". 7 When R 0 has a differentiable representation u 0 and z 0 is an interior bundle of
Example 2 Homothetic preferences:
Let R H be the family of all homothetic preferences that are smooth, 8 strictly convex, and strictly monotonic over R For all
In order to show A3, let R, R ∈D and z, z ∈ M be such that P (R) = P (R ) = M and z = z . Without loss of generality, let z 1 < z 1 . When z 1 = 0, if we letR 1 = R 1 , then (i) and (ii) of A3 hold. Now suppose z 1 = 0. Then let R Leon 1 be the Leontieff-type preference with the locus of kinks equal to M 1 . Then (i) and (ii) holds withR 1 = R Leon 1 . Note that R Leon 1 / ∈ R H but that R H contains a sequence of preferences, which is composed of local transformations of R 1 at z 1 relative to R −1 and, at the same time, converges to R Leon 1 . Therefore, there exist a local transformation of R 1 ,R 1 , which is sufficiently close to R Leon 1 so that (i) and (ii) of A3 can be satisfied.
For all x ∈ R l ++ and all p ∈ R l ++ , there exists a sequence of preferences in R H , which are supported by p at x and converge to the linear preference associated with normal vector p. Therefore F1 holds. Now we only have to verify F2. We show F2 for the 2-good case. However, our argument can be easily extended to the l-good case.
Let i ≡ 1 and d ∈ M. Let R be the preference such that P 1 (R) = {z 1 ∈ Z 0 : z 11 = 0 or z 12 = Ω 2 } and the slope of indifference curves of R 1 over P 1 (R) is bounded above by −δ < 0. Clearly R satisfies (i) of F2. Let z ∈ P (R) \{d} be such that for all p ∈ ∇R (z) , p · z 1 = p · d 1 . Then there exists R 1 ∈ R H such that the slopes of indifference curves of R 1 is bounded below by −δ. Then clearly, P (R 1 , R 2 ) = P (R) and since P 1 (R) is a boundary and monotonic path of the Edgeworth box, 
We show in Lemma 1 that F1 and F2 imply the following more general property.
Double transformability: For all i ∈ N and all
Double transformability has wider applicability. For example, as we saw in Example 3, there is no reference path M such that R 
We divide into three cases.
Case 1: There exists
p ∈ ∇R (z) such that p · z i < p· d i . Then by F1, there exists R i ∈D i (R −i ) such that P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ) = {z i } and d i P i z i . Therefore, if we let R i ≡ R i , then (ii-1) of double transformability holds. Case 2: There exists p ∈ ∇R (z) such that p · z i > p · d i . By F1, there exists R i ∈ D i (R −i ) such that P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC (R i , z i ) ∩ UC (R i , z i ) = {z i }. Since p · z −i < p· d −i , then applying F1 for (R i , R −i ) and agent −i, there exists R −i ∈D −i (R i ) such that P i (R i , R −i )∩LC(R −i , z −i )∩UC(R −i , z i ) = {z −i } and d −i P −i z −i . Therefore, if we let R i ≡ R i , then (ii-2) of double transformability holds. Case 3: For all p ∈ ∇R (z), p · z i = p · d i . By F2, there exists R i ∈D i (R −i ) such that for all z i ∈ P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ), p · z i = p · d i , for some p ∈ ∇(R i , R −i )(z ). If z i ∈ P i (R i , R −i )∩LC(R i , z i )∩UC(R i , z i ) and p ·z i < p ·d i , for some p ∈ ∇(R i , R −i )(z ), then by F1, there exists R i ∈D i (R −i ) such that P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ) = {z i } and d i P i z i . Hence (ii-1) of double transformability holds. On the other hand, if z i ∈ P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ) and p · z i > p · d i , for some p ∈ ∇(R i , R −i )(z ), then p · z −i < p · d −i .
Now applying F1 for (R i , R −i ) and agent −i, there exists R
Zhou (1991) and Schummer (1997) establish an invariance property of efficient and strategy-proof rule with respect to "Maskin monotonic" transformations of preferences.
9 Lemma 2 states an even stronger invariance property related with local transformation. A rule ϕ is invariant with respect to local transformation if for all R ∈ D and all i ∈ N, if R i is a local transformation of R i at z i relative to Proof : Let ϕ be an efficient and strategy-proof rule. Let z ≡ ϕ (R) , i ∈ N, and R i be a local transformation of R i at z i relative to
Lemma 2: Every efficient and strategy-proof rule is invariant with respect to local transformation.
9 Let R ∈ D. Let z ∈ P (R) . A preference R i is a (strong) Maskin monotonic transformation of R i at z if LC(R i , z i ) ⊇ LC(R i , z i ) and LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ) = {z i }.R −i , that is, P i (R i , R −i ) ∩ LC(R i , z i ) ∩ UC(R i , z i ) = {z i }. Let z ≡ ϕ (R i ,
R −i ) . By the two incentive compatibility conditions associated with (R
Next, we show that if the domain is rich with respect to a subdomainD and a set M, then for a rule to be efficient and strategy-proof, it should always pick a fixed allocation for each economy inD with Pareto set M .
Lemma 3: Let D be rich with respect toD ⊆ D and M ⊂ Z. Let ϕ : D → Z be efficient and strategy-proof . Then for all R, R ∈D, if P (R) = P (R ) = M, then ϕ(R) = ϕ(R ).
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Proof: Let R, R ∈D be such that P (R) = P (R ) = M. Let z ≡ ϕ(R) and z ≡ ϕ(R ). Suppose to the contrary
. By (i) and Lemma 2, ϕ(R 1 , R 2 ) = z. By the incentive compatibility associated
, contradicting strategy-proofness.
Q.E.D.
We will show that when a rule gives one agent the whole endowment at a profile, for it to be efficient and strategy-proof, it should be dictatorial over a certain neighborhood of the initial profile.
11 In this sense, dictatorship at a . This preference should be kinked as far as it is homothetic and R i has a different supporting hyperplane at z i from the supporting hyperplane of R i at z i . In restricted domains without kinked preferences, the proof in Schummer (1997) does not work. Our proof does not necessarily require such Maskin monotonic transformation. We only use a preference that satisfies (i) and (ii) in the above proof. Our argument is based on strong invariance property established in Lemma 2. Consequently, as we show in Example 2 and in Section 4 later, Lemma 3 applies in a number of domains without kinked preferences.
11 By using the term "neighborhood" of a profile R, we do not mean an "open" set containing R. It simply means a set containing R.
profile contaminates the choices made for some other profiles. For the formal description, we need the following notation.
, then R is reachable from R through the following three unilateral variations: 
. We callS i (R) the contamination set relative to R and i. Then every R ∈S i (R) is reachable from R through iterative unilateral variations that are 0-indifference-monotonic for −i, and conversely. Note that when D is everywhere reachable * and R −i is strictly monotonic, every R ∈ D is reachable from R through iterative unilateral variations that are 0-indifference-monotonic for −i; soS i (R) = D. ∈ {0, Ω}. By double transformability, there exists R ∈D such that (i) P 1 (R) ∩ M 1 = {0, Ω} and (ii) for all z ∈ P (R) with
Lemma 4: Let ϕ : D → Z be efficient and strategy-proof . If there exist i ∈ N and R ∈ D such that ϕ i (R) = Ω, then ϕ is dictatorial overS i (R).
Proof: Let R ∈ D, i ∈ N, and R ∈ S i (R). Suppose ϕ i (R) = Ω. We only have to show that
. Then clearly z ∈ P (R) and by (i), z 1 = d 1 . Therefore by efficiency and strategy-proofness and (ii), there exists
. This contradicts strategy-proofness. When (ii-2) holds, we can derive a contradiction, using the same argument as above.
Q.E.D.
When the domain satisfies everywhere reachability * in addition, the minimal contamination set in Proposition 1 coincides with the entire domain. 
and make use of the invariance of strategy-proof and efficient rules with respect to Maskin monotonic transformations. Our proof is simpler and works well without kinked preferences. This is because our proof makes use of the stronger invariance property in Lemma 2.
Since every product domain is everywhere reachable * , Theorem 1 applies to rich product domains. 
Applications
In this section, we apply our result in Section 3 to "intertemporal exchange problem", "risk sharing problem", and two restricted domains, the "CES domain" and the "quasilinear domain".
Intertemporal exchange
Let T be the number of periods, T ≥ 2. For each t = 1, · · · , T, let Ω t > 0 be the endowment of a single consumption good at period t. Suppose that there exists no saving technology. Then an allocation (
Each agent i ∈ N has a preference R i represented by a temporal utility function u i : R + → R and a discount factor δ i ∈ (0, 1) as follows: for all x, y ∈ R T + ,
Note that when the temporal utility function u i is concave (respectively, strictly concave), R i is convex (respectively, strictly convex ). Let R IE be the class of all such preferences represented by concave, strictly monotonic, and continuous temporal utility functions. We refer to R N IE as the intertemporal exchange domain. Let R IE-s.con be the class of all preferences in R IE with strictly concave temporal utility functions. Let R IE-lin be the class of preferences in R IE with the linear temporal utility function, u lin (m) = m, for all m ∈ R + . In order to show that the intertemporal exchange domain is rich, we make use of the following subsets of Z. Let P ≡ {z ∈ Z : for some t ∈ {1, · · · , T },
Note that for each i ∈ N, both P i and P i are monotonic path from 0 to (Ω 1 , · · · , Ω T ). 14 Throughout the proof, the linear preference with discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) is denoted by R δ . Then R δ is represented by the following utility function
We make use of the following claim, which states that when both agents have linear preferences, the Pareto set is equal to P (respectively, P ) if and only if agent 2 is more (respectively, less) patient than agent 1. We omit the proof.
Then both A1 and A2 follow from Claim 1.
2 and z, z ∈ M be such that z = z and , R δ 2 ) = P . Since P is a monotonic path,
In the two period case, T = 2, for each agent, there are infinitely many admissible linear preferences in R IE-lin . Schummer (1997) shows that in the 2-good exchange economy case, given any domain with at least four admissible linear preferences for each agent, dictatorial rules are the only efficient and strategy-proof rules. Therefore his result applies. Schummer (1997) extends this result for the 2-good case to the l-good case using specific preferences in which commodities are partitioned into two groups with identical marginal utilities. Such preferences are not admissible in R N IE-lin , since marginal utility decreases in the rate of discount factor over periods. Therefore, when T ≥ 3, Schummer's result does not apply.
14 Fix ρ ∈ (0, 1). Let u such that u (m) = −e −ρm for all m ∈ R + . LetD be the family of profiles of preferences represented by u and a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). ThenD ⊆ R N IE-s.con . For each discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) , let U δ : R 2 + → R be the utility function associated with u and δ and let R δ be the corresponding preference. We can establish the following claim, similar to Claim 1 in Proof of Proposition 2.
Using this claim and the same argument with a slight modification as in Proof of Proposition 2, we can show thatD and M ≡ P satisfy A1-A3 and double transformability.
Then P (R 1 , R 2 ) = P and (ii-2) of double transformability holds.
Q.E.D.
Remark 2:
Intertemporal exchange domains with bounded difference in agents' discount factors: It may be the case that both agents share a common cultural background relevant to impatience. Then it is appealing to assume that their impatience levels are not too different; that is, the difference of their discount factors is bounded by a fixed positive number. IE are strictly monotonic, we only have to show that R is reachable from R through iterative unilateral variations, which can be constructed by changing discount factors first as follows (δ 1 , δ 2 ) → (δ 1 , δ 2 ) → (δ 1 , δ 2 ) and then changing temporal utility functions as follows (
Risk sharing
Let S be the number of states, S ≥ 2. For each s = 1, · · · , S, let Ω s > 0 be the endowment at state s. We consider the problem of allocating these endowments prior to the realization of state. An allocation is a list of state contingent consumption bundles indexed by agents, z ≡ (z i ) i∈N ∈ R S×N + . Each agent i ∈ N has a preference R i that is represented by a subjective probability distribution, or belief, π i ≡ (π is ) s ∈ ∆ S−1 and a utility index u i : R + → R in the expected utility form as follows: for all x, y ∈ R
We assume that π i > 0 and that u i is strictly increasing and continuous. We further assume that u i is concave. Let R RS be the family of all such expected utility preferences. We refer to R N RS as the risk sharing domain. Preference R i is risk averse if u i is strictly concave. It is risk neutral if u i is the linear function u lin , that is, for all m ∈ R + , u lin (m) = m. Let R RS-aver be the family of all risk averse preferences. Let R RS-neut be the family of all risk neutral preferences. Note that in the risk sharing domain both belief and utility index of each agent are private information and so it differs from Example 1.
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Let R 0 ∈ R IE be the preference in Section 4.1, which is represented by a temporal convex utility function u 0 and discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) . Then R 0 is represented by the following utility function U : for all
Therefore, when T = S, R 0 coincides with the preference in R RS with utility index u 0 and the following belief, 
This shows that
Remark 3 Risk sharing domains with bounded difference in agents' beliefs:
When both agents share information on the state space, their beliefs will be affected commonly. Then, agents' beliefs may not be too far from each other. 
Other restricted domains
In this section, we show that the domain of "CES preferences" is flexible (so, rich) and the domain of "quasilinear", strictly convex, and smooth preferences is rich.
A preference R 0 is a CES preference if there exist (a 1 , · · · , a l ) ∈ R l ++ and ρ ∈ (−∞, 1) such that R 0 is represented by the following utility function u 0 : for all x ∈ R l ++ ,
Let R CES be the class of all CES preferences. We refer to R N CES as the CESdomain.
Proposition 4:
The CES-domain is flexible and everywhere reachable * .
Proof:
Everywhere reachability * is obvious. Let M ≡ {z ∈ Z : z 1 ∈ 0, Ω}. We show that R N CES and M satisfy A1, A2, A3, F1, and F2. The first four properties can be shown similarly to Example 2. We are left with F2. In what follows, we only consider the 2-good case; our argument can be extended to the l-good case. 16 We use the following property of Pareto set for homothetic preferences. Let i ∈ N and d i ∈ M i . Without loss of generality we set i ≡ 1. We show that for some R ∈ R N CES , (i) P 1 (R) ∩ M 1 = {0, Ω} and (ii) if z ∈ P (R) \{d} and p · z 1 = p · d 1 for all p ∈ ∇R(z), then there existsR 1 ∈ R CES such that for all z 1 ∈ P 1 (R 1 , R 2 )∩LC(R 1 , z 1 )∩UC(R 1 , z 1 ), p·z 1 = p·d 1 for some p ∈ ∇(R 1 , R 2 )(z). 16 For the l-good case, we simply use the following relations between some special preference profiles in the l-good case and their counterparts in the 2-good case. Let R Q,ρ be the set of preferences represented by u a for some a > 0. Let M 1 ≡ {z ∈Z : z 11 = 0 or 5 Concluding remarks 1. In several other economic environments, a number of authors have reported the same impossibility results as in the 2-agent exchange economy. Among others are Walker (1980) , Zhou (1991b) , Schummer (1999) , Serizawa (2000) , and Le Breton and Weymark (1999) . Identification of general domain properties that induce their impossibility results will be an interesting research agenda.
2. Our conclusion makes use of the strong invariance property of efficient and strategy-proof rules, which is established in Lemma 2. The same invariance property will hold in other economic environments with the addition of "nonbossiness" in more than two agents cases. Examples are exchange economies with more than two agents, classical production economies, public goods economies, etc. Application of the strong invariance property may lead to simpler proofs and extensions of the existing results, for example, by Walker (1980) , Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981) , Serizawa (2000) , and Schummer (1999) .
